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a b s t r a c t
Let M be a single s–t network of parallel links with load dependent latency functions
shared by an infinite number of selfish users. This may yield a Nash equilibrium with
unbounded Coordination Ratio [E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria,
in: 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS, vol. 1563,
1999, pp. 404–413; T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing? in: 41st IEEE
Annual Symposium of Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS, 2000, pp. 93–102]. A Leader
can decrease the coordination ratio by assigning flow αr on M , and then all Followers
assign selfishly the (1 − α)r remaining flow. This is a Stackelberg Scheduling Instance
(M, r, α), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It was shown [T. Roughgarden, Stackelberg scheduling strategies,
in: 33rd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC, 2001, pp. 104–113] that it is
weakly NP-hard to compute the optimal Leader’s strategy.
For any such networkM we efficiently compute theminimum portion βM of flow r > 0
needed by a Leader to induceM ’s optimum cost, as well as her optimal strategy. This shows
that the optimal Leader’s strategy on instances (M, r, α ≥ βM) is in P .
Unfortunately, Stackelberg routing in more general nets can be arbitrarily hard.
Roughgarden presented a modification of Braess’s Paradox graph, such that no strategy
controlling αr flow can induce ≤ 1
α
times the optimum cost. However, we show that our
main result also applies to any s–t net G. We take care of the Braess’s graph explicitly, as a
convincing example. Finally, we extend this result to k commodities.
A conference version of this paper has appeared in [A. Kaporis, P. Spirakis, The price
of optimum in stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency
functions, in: 18th annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures,
SPAA, 2006, pp. 19–28]. Some preliminary results have also appeared as technical report
in [A.C. Kaporis, E. Politopoulou, P.G. Spirakis, The price of optimum in stackelberg games,
in: Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, ECCC, (056), 2005].
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In large scale networks such as Internet the users/providers have freedom on how to route their load. This allows them
to make their choices according to their own individual performance objectives, bringing the network to fixed points many
times worse than the optimum one [10]. Such selfish behavior is being studied with the notion of Nash Equilibrium in the
mathematical framework of Game Theory [8,20–22,26,30,31,37,44].
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Fig. 1. Latencies are: `1(x) = x, `2(x) = 1. Fig. 2. Leader’s strategy is: S = 〈0, o2〉 =
〈0, 1/2〉.
Fig. 3. S induces NE T = 〈o1, 0〉 = 〈1/2, 0〉.
As a measure of how inefficient the Nash equilibrium is compared to the overall system’s optimum, the notion of
coordination ratio was introduced in the seminal paper of [22]. This work has been extended (price of anarchy is another
equivalent term) in [7,6,13,25,33,32,41,38,37,42,35]. The interested reader can find nice presentations of this subject in the
recent books [29,41].
To improve the performance of the system under selfish behavior a great variety of methodologies have been considered
so far. These methodologies intend to bring the system to fixed points closer to its optimum performance. The network
administrator or designer can define prices, rules or even construct the network, in such a way that induces near optimal
performance when the users selfishly use the system. This can be achieved through pricing policies [4], algorithmic
mechanisms [11,28,27], network design [19,35], or routing a small portion of the traffic centrally [23,20,37].
Particulary interesting is the last approach where the network manager affects the non-cooperative game. The manager
has the ability to control centrally a part of the system resources, while the remaining resources are used by the selfish users.
This approachhas been studied through Stackelbergor Leader-Follower games [23,2,20,21,37,46]. Oneplayer (Leader) controls
a portion of the system’s jobs and assigns them to the system (Stackelberg assignment). The rest of the users (Followers) having
in mind the assignment of the Leader react selfishly and reach a Nash equilibrium. The assignment of Leader and Followers
is called Stackelberg Equilibrium. The goal of the Leader is to induce an optimal or near optimal Stackelberg Equilibrium.
1.1. Motivation & related work
(i) Single-commodity networks with parallel links. Consider a system M of parallel links and a total of flow r > 0 to be
scheduled on M , denoted as a Scheduling Instance (M, r). Given an scheduling instance (M, r), there is a unique Optimum
assignment O of flow r > 0 on system M minimizing the total cost C(O) incurred on system M . We study the case of an
infinite number of selfish users, each assigning its infinitesimal small portion of total flow r > 0 on links inM of currently
minimum delay. Let the cost C(N) of the Nash assignment N on the scheduling instance (M, r). Then,
C(N) = (M,r) × C(O) (1)
where (M,r) depends only on instance (M, r) and can be arbitrarily larger than 1 [42], but if all links in M have linear
load depended latency functions, then (M,r) ≤ 4/3 [22]. We try to obtain a more clear picture of this degradation on
system’s performance, measured by the factor (M,r), by studying Stackelberg Scheduling Instances as in [37], and as in [20]
where we focus on the case of an infinite number of users. According to [37,20] there is a central authority (Leader) that
controls a portion 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the overall flow r > 0 to be assigned on system M , while the rest (1 − α)r of the flow
is assigned by the infinite self-optimizing users (Followers) onM . In [37] this is denoted as a Stackelberg Scheduling Instance
(M, r, α), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This means that each scheduling instance (M, r) corresponds to a family of Stackelberg scheduling
instances (M, r, α), parameterized with respect to α ∈ [0, 1]. Given a Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α), the goal of
the Leader is to find an assignment (strategy) S of his flow αr on M , such that to induce a Followers’s assignment T of the
remaining (1− α)r flow, with cost C(S + T ) near to the optimum C(O) one. That is
C(S + T ) ≤ (M,r,α) × C(O). (2)
Let us use the name ‘‘a-posteriori anarchy cost’’ for the quantity (M,r,α). Note that the a-posteriori anarchy cost depends on
the strategy chosen by the Leader and on the portion α of the flow that she controls.
Example ([36, pp. 9] Stackelberg Parlance on Pigou’s Example). In Fig. 1, linkM1 is faster thanM2, thus the selfish flow
N floods M1 (Fig. 1-down). A bad operating point arises: C(N) > C(O), where the optimum O is to balance r = 1 to
both links (Fig. 1-up). This induces the worst anarchy cost (M, 1) = 4/3. A way out is in Fig. 2: Leader routes 1/2 of r
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into slow linkM2. This is a wise strategy. Since, in Fig. 3, the remaining free 1/2 flow induces the optimum operating
point and – the best possible – a posteriori anarchy cost (M,1,1/2) = 1.
More precisely, in [41, Th. 6.4.4] it was proved that (M,r,α) ≤ 1α , 0 < α ≤ 1 for arbitrary latency functions, and if
restricted to instances with linear latencies then (M,r,α) ≤ 43+α [41, Th. 6.4.5]. From Expression (2), we realize that the
portion α captured by the Leader ‘‘pays’’ an upper bound on system’s degradation factor (M,r,α) which is smaller than the
plain one in Expression (1), see also [23]. More precisely, [37] presented the algorithm LLF that, on input a Stackelberg
scheduling instance (M, r, α), computes a Leader’s strategy S inducing Nash assignment T with performance guarantee
C(S+T ) ≤ 1
α
C(O). However, on the same Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α) theremay exist a better Leader’strategy
S ′ inducing T ′ such that C(S ′ + T ′) < C(S + T ), see footnote 6 in [37]. This means that LLF cannot always compute the
optimal strategy. Also, there may exist a strategy S ′′, escaping from LLF, such that C(S ′′ + T ′′) = C(O). Such limitations are
depicted in the negative result in [37] stating that the problem of computing the Optimal Stackelberg strategy on a given
Stackelberg scheduling instance (M, r, α) is weakly NP-hard. A way out of this negative result was a FPAS devised in [23].
On approximating the optimal strategy, it is difficult to decide whether an arbitrary link receives a-posteriori induced flow
or not, which reduces to a multidimensional knapsack problem in [23]. Our approach here eludes this difficulty by carefully
identifying the corresponding subsetsM>0(M=0) via recursively assigning ‘‘wise’’ amounts of flow per proper subset of links,
see Section 7.3.
(ii) s–t networks. Finally, an important question of [37] that motivated us is the extension of the above results to arbitrary
network graphs, closer to the nature of real networks. Given an arbitrary single source-destination (s, t)-network G, can
a Leader wisely assign here α portion on some edges, inducing a selfish s → t routing of the remaining flow with best
possible cost? In [41, Example 6.5.1] it was exhibited a simple 4-nodes graph where no strategy can guarantee cost 1
α
times
the optimum one. Notably, this 4-node graph is reminiscent to the one of Braess’s Paradox. Before the publication of this
work in [15,17], no performance guarantee as a function of the centrally controlled portion α was known for (s, t)-nets.
After the publication of our work in [15,17] a series of papers explored further important issues on Stackelberg routing
on more general network topologies. For general networks and linear latencies, Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [18] bounded
the anarchy cost via strategies SCALE and LLF. They also extended these results to more general latencies. In this vain,
Swamy [45] obtained similar bounds for serial-parallel graphs with arbitrary latencies, while for more general graphs, he
obtained latency-specific bounds on PoA. Recently, Fotakis [12] investigated similar strategies for atomic congestion games.
The papers [5,3] are related to the aforementioned results, both investigating further the performance of strategy SCALE
and a variation of LLF on general nets. Finally, our work is related to the recent paper of Sharma and Williamson [43]. They
compute, on parallel linkswith linear latencies, the correspondingminimumportion of controlled flow sufficient to improve
on the system’s cost with respect to selfish routing.
(iii) Arbitrary multi-commodity nets. Even less was known for Stackelberg strategies on arbitrary networks before the
publication of our work in [15,17]. Some of the corresponding recent results in [3,5,18,45] also extend to k commodities.
More recently, [3] answered in the negative the [39, Open Problem 4] and improved the bounds in [45].
2. Problem definition & results
Problem: The input is a scheduling instance (M, r) where r > 0 is the total flow andM is either m parallel links, or an s–t
network, or, even a multi commodity net, with arbitrary load dependent edge latencies as in Section 4. The problem is to
efficiently compute the minimum portion βM of flow r > 0 that a Leader must control, as well as her optimal strategy S, in
order to induce the overall optimum cost C(O) on (M, r). The main result is Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. Let (M, r) be a multicommodity instance with k source/destination pairs si-ti on an arbitrary network M, modeled
as a directed graph. We can efficiently compute the minimum portion βM of flow controlled by a Leader as to induce the optimum
routing of total flow r > 0 on instance (M, r). We also efficiently compute the associated optimal strategy of the Leader.
The proof appears in Section 5.1.
Direct consequences of this theorem are Corollaries 2.2 (s–t parallel links) and 2.3 (s–t network). In particular,
Corollary 2.2 shows that the algorithm OpTop efficiently solves the problem on parallel links. A helpful1 illustration of
OpTop appears in Section 3.1.
Algorithm: OpTop (M : parallel links, r : total flow.)
(1) Set r0 = r the total flow inM .
Compute the optimum assignment O := 〈oi : Mi ∈ M〉 on instance (M, r0). SetM ′ ≡ ∅.
(2) Compute the Nash assignment N := 〈ni : Mi ∈ M〉 on instance (M, r).
(3) For each linkMi ∈ M such that oi > ni setM ′ = M ′ ∪ {Mi}. IfM ′ ≡ ∅ go to (5).
(4) SetM = M \M ′ and O := O \ {oi ∈ M ′} and r = r −∑Mi∈M ′ oi. SetM ′ ≡ ∅ and go to (2).
(5) The portion of flow controlled by the Leader is βM = (r0 − r)/r0.
1 At the endof this paper, Section 7presentsmonotonicity properties ofOpTop’s evolution. These propertiesmayhelp to improve intuition on Stackelberg
strategies.
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Corollary 2.2. Let (M, r) be an s–t parallel-links instance. AlgorithmOpTop runs in polynomial time and computes theminimum
portion βM of total flow r > 0 that a Leader must control to induce overall optimum routing on (M, r), as well as the optimal
Stackelberg strategy.
Corollary 2.2 implies that on all Stackelberg scheduling instances of the form (M, r, α ≥ βM), a Leader can enforce the
Optimum cost C(O), and the problem of computing the Optimum Stackelberg strategy is in P . This eludes the hardness result
in [40, Theorem 6.1] and finally answers an open question in [36, page 28]. In view of Expression (2), for such instances the
factor (M,r,α≥βM ) is precisely 1. On the contrary, for all Stackelberg sceduling instances (M, r, α < βM) it is not possible for a
Leader to enforce the Optimum cost. Then in Expression (2) we get that (M,r,α<βM ) > 1, which means that such Stackelberg
scheduling instances are the really hard ones andwe can try to attack these by sophisticated fully polynomial approximation
schemes [23]. Such non-optimizing behavior was presented also in [20], for the restricted case of M/M/1 systems of distinct
links. Notably, if such M/M/1 systems contain small groups of highly appealing links or there are large groups of identical
links then βM may be significantly small.
Generalizing the previous algorithm on s–t nets, we get algorithm MOP, where in turn, Corollary 2.2 shows that it
efficiently solves the problem. A helpful illustration of MOP appears in Section 3.2.
Algorithm: MOP (G : an s–t net, r : total flow)
(1) Initialize Stackelberg strategy S = {}, centrally captured flow rS = 0.
(2) Compute the optimum assignment O := 〈oe : e ∈ G〉 on instance (G, r).
(3) Set cost `e(oe) on each edge e ∈ G, oe ∈ O.
(4) Compute the shortest paths in Gwith edge-costs `e(oe), e ∈ G. Let P Os→t the set of shortest paths.
(5) Control flow OP > 0 on each non shortest path P 6∈ P Os→t .
(6) Set r ′ the uncontrolled flow which routes through shortest paths P Os→t .
(7) Return the Leader’s portion βG = 1− r ′r .
Corollary 2.3. Let instance (M, r) on a s–t network M. Algorithm MOP computes in polynomial time the minimum portion βM of
Leader’s flow, sufficient to induce the optimum routing of flow r > 0 on network G, as well as the optimal strategy of the Leader.
Corollary 2.3 implies that, despite the negative result depicted in [41, Example 6.5.1], algorithm MOP efficiently computes
the optimal strategy on arbitrary nets, yielding approximation guarantee 1, see in this respect the open problem in [36,
page 29]. In particular, we take care this bad example of net routing in Section 3.2.
On hard instances of parallel-links. Trying to understand further the underlying complexity of hard instances (M, r, α <
βM), we focus on parallel links, with appropriate load dependent latency functions that, hopefully, may admit efficient
computation of the optimal strategy. Our motivation is the case of simple followers (which is identical to an infinite number
of followers that we consider here) studied in Section 8 in [20].
Theorem 2.4. The optimal Stackelberg strategy is computed in polynomial time on any instance (M, r, α < βM)with m parallel
links where each link has linear latency `i(x) = ax+ bi, a ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
The proof appears in Section 6.1. This theorem squeezes ‘‘efficiency’’ from the class of linear latencies, shown hard in the
reduction in [40, Theorem 6.1].
Remark 2.5. The results of this paper concern instanceswith strictly increasing latencies, pervasive in real-world networks,
see the classical [1] work of Patriksson [34, Ch. 4] and also the pioneering work of Dafermos et al. [8, Sec. 1.3]. A property
important to our analysis, is that on such instances Optimum O and NE N edge flows are unique. In [16] we extend such
instances, while preserving uniqueness of optimum edge flows, by even allowing edges with constant latencies.
3. Examples on computing the price of optimum
3.1. s–t parallel links
Algorithm OpTop of Corollary 2.2 works as follows:
1. Compute the Optimum O := 〈o1, . . . , om〉 (Fig. 4-up) & Nash N := 〈n1, . . . , nm〉 (Fig. 4-down).
2. Detect the under-loaded (Definition 4.3) linksMi ∈ M with ni < oi (Fig. 4, linksM4,M5).
3. Play Stackelberg strategy si = oi per under-loaded linkMi ∈ M (Fig. 5-up).
4. Discard these under-loaded links and the flow assigned to them (Fig. 5-down).
5. Assign the remaining flow recursively to the simplified subnetwork of links.
6. Terminate if the simplified subnetwork has all the links optimum-loaded (Fig. 6).
3.2. s–t networks
Let Ps→t be the s→ t paths on instance (G, r). Algorithm MOP of Corollary 2.3 works as follows:
1. Compute the optimum flow O, assigning flow oe and latency `e(oe) per edge e ∈ G (Fig. 7-(a)).
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Fig. 4. `1(x) = x, `2(x) = 3/2x, `3(x)
= 2x, `4(x) = 5/2x+ 1/6, `5(x) = 7/10.
Fig. 5. Up: OpTop optimally loadsM4,M5 . Down:
OpTop discardsM4,M5 .
Fig. 6. OpTop terminates: the remaining 1 −
O4 − O5 selfish flow just induced NE equal to the
Optimum.
Fig. 7. The total flow is r = 1. Details on this instance can be found in [41, Example 6.5.1]. (a) The optimal edge-flows are: os→v = 34 − , os→w =
1
4 + , ov→w = 12 − 2, ov→t = 14 + , ow→t = 34 − . (b) The shortest path induced by optimum flow O is: P0 = s → v → w → t , with flow
OP0 = 12 − 2. (c) Non-shortest paths are: P1 = s→ v → t & P2 = s→ w→ t , with flows OP1 = 14 +  and OP2 = 14 + . (d) The Price of Optimum is:
βG = r−OP0r .
2. Compute the shortest paths Os→t ⊆ Ps→t with respect to costs `e(oe),∀e ∈ G, (see Fig. 7-(b)).
3. Play the Stackelberg strategy assigning the optimal flow OP > 0 on each path P 6∈ Os→t (Fig. 7-(c)).
4. The Price of Optimum βG = (the optimal flow on all non-shortest paths)/r (Fig. 7-(d)).
Remark 3.1. In s–t parallel links with arbitrary latency functions, a simple algorithm controls α ∈ [0, 1] portion of flow
and induces an equilibriumwith cost≤ 1
α
times the optimum one ( 1
α
approximation guarantee). Roughgarden showed [41,
Example 6.5.1] that the above bound is not possible to hold for s–t networks. This was demonstrated with a selfish routing
example on the graph in Fig. 7. The importance of our example here stems from the fact that on this particular graph in
Fig. 7, MOP achieves the optimum cost (thus, its approximation guarantee equals 1, which is≤ 1
α
,∀α ∈ [0, 1)).
4. Model
We briefly present the model below, discussed thoroughly in [41].
s–t parallel links:Wehavem parallel linksM = {M1, . . . ,Mm} connecting a source s to a sink vertex t . An infinite number of
userswish to route from s to t , each controlling an infinitesimal small portion of a total flow r > 0. Each linkMi ∈ M on flow xi
has standard latency function: `i(xi) ≥ 0 differentiable, strictly increasing2 and xi`i(xi) convex on xi. Any assignment of jobs
to the links inM is represented as a feasible m-vector X = 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 ∈ Rm such that X ≥ 0 and∑mi=1 xi = r . A routing
instance is annotated as (M, r). The Cost of a feasible assignment X ∈ Rm on instance (M, r) equals C(X) = ∑mi=1 xi`i(xi).
The minimum cost is incurred by a unique feasible assignment O ∈ Rm called the Optimum. The unique feasible assignment
N ∈ Rm defines aNash Equilibrium (NE), if no user can find a linkwith latency< than any other loaded link. A consequence is:
Remark 4.1. All loaded links by N have latency LN , while the empty ones have latency≥ LN , where LN > 0 is an appropriate
constant.
A Stackelberg strategy S = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉 is a feasible flow of a portion βr of r > 0 on M, β ∈ [0, 1]. In other words,∑m
i=1 si = βr and si ≥ 0 per link Mi ∈ M . Let T = 〈t1, . . . , tm〉 be the induced NE (INE) by strategy S. Hence, T satisfies∑m
i=1 ti = (1− β)r with ti ≥ 0 per link i ∈ M , and by rephrasing Remark 4.1, we get:
2 See Remark 2.5.
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Remark 4.2. All loaded links by T have latency LS , while the empty ones (by T ) have latency ≥ LS , where LS > 0 is an
appropriate constant depending on S.
The flow S + T is called Stackelberg Equilibriumwith cost C(S + T ) =∑mi=1(si + ti)`i(si + ti).
Definition 4.3. Link Mi ∈ M is called over-loaded if ni > oi, under-loaded if ni < oi, otherwise is called optimum-loaded,
i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 4.4. LinkMi ∈ M is frozen if Stackelberg strategy S assigns to it load si ≥ niwhereN is the initial Nash assignment.
OtherwiseMi is unfrozen.
Multicommodity networks: A network can be modeled as a directed graph G(V , E) with set of vertices V and edges E.
There are k source-destination pairs of vertices3 (s1, t1), . . . , (sk, tk) and no self loops are allowed. Pi is the set of all paths
amongst (si, ti), i = 1, . . . , k, and P = ⋃i Pi. An infinite number of users wish to route from each si to ti, each controlling
an infinitesimal small portion of total flow ri > 0. Let f = 〈fP : P ∈ P 〉 be a flow r = ∑ki=1 ri to the paths in P , where
fP denotes the flow traveling through path P ∈ P . The flow fe on edge e ∈ E is the flow it receives from all paths in P
traversing e. On a pair (si, ti), we let f i be the restriction of f to Pi, i = 1, . . . , k. The total of flow wishing to travel through
source-destination pair (si, ti) is ri and f is feasible if the flow it assigns on the paths in Pi is ri. Edges are endowed with
latency functions as in the parallel-links model above.4 The latency of a path P ∈ Pi with respect to flow f is the sum of its
edge-latencies `P(f ) = ∑e∈P `e(fe). The cost of a flow f is C(f ) = ∑e∈E `e(fe)fe = ∑P∈P `P(f )fP . The unique Optimal flow
O is the one minimizing the cost C(·) of scheduling flow r > 0 on network G and can be efficiently computed. A feasible
flow N is a Nash equilibrium on G if an only if for every commodity i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and paths P1, P2 ∈ Pi with fP1 > 0 we
have `P1(f ) ≤ `P2(f ). In other words, in each source-destination pair (si, ti) no flow traveling through loaded path P1 ∈ Pi
can find any other path P2 ∈ Pi with < latency. A Stackelberg strategy S = 〈sP : P ∈ P 〉 on instance (G, r) is a feasible
assignment of a portion βr, β ∈ [0, 1] of the total flow r > 0 on the paths in P . A Leader dictates a weak Stackelberg
strategy if on each commodity i = 1, . . . , k controls a fixed α portion of flow ri, α ∈ [0, 1]. Also, on a strong Stackelberg
strategy a Leader controls αiri flow in commodity i such that
∑k
i=1 αi = α. Let a Leader dictating flow se on edge e ∈ E. Let
T = 〈τ1, . . . , τm〉 be the induced NE (INE) by strategy S of the remaining (1−β)r selfish flow. The a posteriori latency˜`e(τe)
of edge e, with respect to the induced selfish flow T , equals˜`e(τe) = `e(τe + se). In the a-posteriori Nash equilibrium T , all
si-ti paths traversed by the selfish users in commodity i have a common latency, which is at least the latency of any empty
path in commodity i = 1, . . . , k. The induced cost of flow S + T is∑e∈E(τe + se)×˜`e(τe).
Remark 4.5. In [12,23,40] the NE N and Optimum O flows are given as input. On the basis these flows, subsequent
Stackelberg strategies are efficiently computed. In general, O and N flows can be efficiently computed and more details can
be found in [41, Fact 2.4.9, Cor. 2.6.7], see also [41, Sec. 2.8]. For strictly increasing latencies, the corresponding edge-flows
are unique [41, Cor. 2.6.4]. This extends to real-world instances endowed with edges with increasing latencies [16].
5. Proof of the main result on k commodities
In this section we prove main Theorem 2.1, which yields Corollaries 2.2 and 2.3.
5.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1
LetP (i)s→t be the set of all si-ti paths on a k-commodity instance G, i = 1, . . . , k. On commodity i, we efficiently compute5
the subset P O,(i)s→t of shortest paths P
O,(i)
s→t ⊆ P (i)s→t with respect to optimum costs `e(oe),∀e ∈ G.
Leadermust control under strategy S the optimum flowOP assigned byO on every non shortest path P ∈ P (i)s→t \P O,(i)s→t ,∀i.
First, suppose that exists path P ∈ P (i)s→t such that Leader controls flow SP > OP under strategy S. Then the induced flow
S + T will differ from the unique optimum flow O at least on this particular path P , yielding suboptimal cost. Therefore it is
meaningful for Leader, ∀P ∈ P (i)s→t , to assign only flow SP ≤ OP under any strategy S she employs.
Now, suppose that in commodity i there exists non shortest path P0 ∈ P (i)s→t \ P O,(i)s→t such that Leader controls flow
SP0 < OP0 under strategy S. The remaining uncontrolled flow OP0 − SP0 on this non shortest path will opt for a currently
shortest path inP O,(i)s→t . Then the induced flow S+T will differ from the unique optimum flow O on this sub-optimally loaded
path P0. Furthermore, Leader need not waste any flow SP ≤ OP on any shortest path P ∈ P O,(i)s→t , because in this way path P
still remains a shortest one, and thus, any OP0 − SP0 uncontrolled flow in the aforementioned non shortest P0 will opt for P ,
yielding S + T 6= O.
It follows that the only choice for the Leader is to optimally load every non shortest path P ∈ P (i)s→t\P O,(i)s→t per commodity i.
3 si denotes a source vertex, while se the Leader’s flow on edge e and their meaning will be clear from the context.
4 See Remark 2.5.
5 ImplementingDijkstra’s algorithm, for example as in [9], compute subgraphG ⊆ G containing all edges traversed by a shortest pathwith respect to edge
costs incurred by O. Per source si of commodity i, compute (free flow) the flow by O going through edges in G adjacent to si . This gives the controlled flow
βGr , which is r minus the total free flow. Leader assigns this βGr controlled flow on G by loading se = oe,∀e 6∈ G, satisfying the standard multicommodity
flow constraints.
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Fig. 8. The loads and latencies on M1 and M2
links: load s1 encounters latency `1 on link M1
& load s2 + t2 encounters latency `2 ≤ `1 on
linkM2 .
Fig. 9. InterchangeM1 ’s andM2 ’s loads: s1 goes
to M2 increasing the latency to `2′ > `1 while
s2 + t2 goes to M1 decreasing the latency to
`1′ < `2 .
Fig. 10. Move load  from M2 (decreasing M2 ’s
latency to M1 ’s old one `1) to M1 (increasing
M1 ’s latency to M2 ’s old one `2). The cost is ≤
in Fig. 8.
6. s–t parallel links on hard instances (M, r, α < βM )
Here we prove Theorem 2.4. Consider an instance (M, r) ofm parallel links, with latency functions `i(x) = ax+ bi, a ≥
0, bi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m. With no loss of generality, assume that the constant terms of the latencies are strictly increasing,
that is, bi < bi+1, per link i = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
In Lemma 6.1 we show that on any instance (M, r, α < βM) there is a Leader’s optimal strategy that partitions
M = {M1, . . . ,Mi0 , . . . ,Mm} around some link Mi0 such that subsystem M>0(i0) (containing links appealing to Followers)
isM>0(i0) = {M1, . . . ,Mi0} and subsystemM=0(i0) (containing links that Followers dislike) isM=0(i0) = {Mi0+1, . . . ,Mm} .
Lemma 6.1. There exists an optimal strategy of S of the leader, such that all links in M=0 have indices greater than ones of the
links in M>0. This strategy can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let S be an optimal strategy for the Leader and T the corresponding induced Nash assignment. Suppose that S does
not satisfy the property of Lemma6.1,with no loss of generality, assume thatM1 ∈ M=0 (whichmeans t1 = 0) andM2 ∈ M>0
(which means t2 > 0), see Fig. 8. The partial cost of S + T on subsystem {M1,M2} equals:
s1`1(s1)+ (s2 + t2)`2(s2 + t2) =
s1`1 + (s2 + t2)`2 = A (3)
with `1 ≥ `2.
We show how to reassign the Leader’s flow s1 + s2 on subsystem {M1,M2}, in a way that t1 > 0 (hence satisfying the
property of Lemma 6.1), inducing partial cost ≤ A and latency ≤ `2 on the most appealing link. In this way, we get a new
Leader strategy, with cost≤ A, that satisfies the property described in Lemma 6.1.
First, interchange the loads between M1 and M2, i.e. load s1 goes from M1 to M2 and load s2 + t2 goes from M2 to M1,
see Fig. 9. This decreases the latency on M1 to `1
′
< `2. Also it increases the latency on M2 to `2
′
> `1. Since the latency
functions have parallel plots, we can remove load  ≥ 0 fromM2 till the latency it experiences drops from `2′ to `1 and place
it toM2 raising its latency from `1
′
to `2, see Fig. 10. The new cost on {M1,M2} is:
(s2 + t2 + )`1(s2 + t2 + )+ (s1 − )`2(s1 − ) =
(s2 +  + t2)`2 + (s1 − )`1 = A+ (`2 − `1) ≤ A,
since `2 ≤ `1,  ≥ 0. 
6.1. Proof of Theorem 2.4
Given an instance (M, r, α), fix a partition M>0(i0) = {M1, . . . ,Mi0} and M=0(i0) = {Mi0+1, . . . ,Mm} of system M
(by Lemma 6.1 there are ≤ m such partitions). We wish to find 0 ≤ i0 ≤ αr such that the partial cost on subsystem
(M>0(i0), (1 − α)r + i0) by selfishly routing (1 − α)r + i0 flow on it (such that no machine in M>0(i0) remains empty),
added to the partial cost on subsystem (M=0(i0), αr − i0), when optimally assigning αr − i0 flow on it, is minimized. The
constraint is that the common latency in (M>0(i0), (1−α)r+i0)must be atmost the latency of any link in (M=0(i0), αr−i0),
otherwise users inM>0(i0)will opt for machines inM=0(i0) destroying the induced assignment.
The cost on subsystem (M>0(i0), (1−α)r+i0) reduces to computing the cost of theNash assignment of flow (1−α)r+i0
onto subsystemM>0(i0). The cost on subsystem (M=0(i0), αr − i0) reduces to computing the Optimum assignment of flow
αr − i0 onto subsystemM=0(i0). Such computations can be done efficiently for linear latencies. The addition of both costs
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is acceptable, only if for the given value of i0 , all links inM>0(i0) become loaded, and their common latency L
i0 is at most
the minimum latency experienced in any link in M=0(i0) (in case of violation of any such constraint, we set the cost equal
to∞).
Notice here that for a given (M, r, α < βM) and any index i0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, the partial cost on (M>0(i0), (1−α)r+i0)
is strictly increasing on i0 , while the partial cost on (M=0(i0), αr−i0) is strictly decreasing on i0 . This allows as to efficiently
compute the value ∗i0 that minimizes the sum C(
∗
i0
) of the partial costs.
The optimal Leader strategy is determined by the tuple (ι, ει), ι ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, 0 ≤ ει ≤ αr such that C(ει) =
min{C(∗1 ), . . . , C(∗m−1)}.
7. Miscellaneous: More on OpTop & parallel links
Thehardness of computing the optimal Leader’s strategy stems fromavariant of the Partitionproblem [40, Theorem6.1].
Intuitively, the exponentially many ways for the Leader to place her αr flow on the m links make elusive the identification
of the optimal strategy.
Section 7.2 helps to significantly prune the search space, where Theorem 7.2 identifies all useful strategies. Any useful
strategy S induces Nash T with cost C(S + T ) 6= C(N), N is the initial equilibrium when all users are free. According to this
theorem,6 C(S+T ) 6= C(N) holds only if strategy S assigns load sj > nj to at least one linkMj (freezes linkMj, Definition 4.4),
where nj equals the initial Nash load.
Theorem 7.2 forces Leader to freeze at least one link (assign more than Nash load), otherwise the induced cost C(S + T )
equals the Nash cost C(N).
Having played S, Leader now faces the difficulty of identifying, amongst the links loaded by S, those that will (or not)
receive induced selfish flow (see the discussion in [23, Section 3.2, 2nd paragraph] and also here in Section 7.3) and
subsequently ruin (or maintain) her assignment. The way out is presented in Section 7.3. In this section, Theorem 7.4 and
Lemma 7.5 will help Leader escape this difficulty and will allow her to dynamically discover her optimal strategy as OpTop
evolutes. Theorem 7.4 and its extension Lemma 7.5 prove that as soon as a linkMj gets load sj ≥ nj (linkMj becomes frozen)
then no induced selfish load (tj = 0) will be assigned to it, irrespectively of the assignment S to the remaining links.
Leader takes advantage of the discussions in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 and exploits link-by-link her optimal strategy S, as
described in Section 7.4: Leader is forced by Theorem 7.2 to overload sj > nj at least one link Mj (otherwise the induced
cost remains C(N)). Any frozen link Mj must be optimum-loaded sj : nj < sj = oj (Definition 4.3). Otherwise, the flow
sj : nj < sj 6= oj it receives is not possible to be affected by the induced selfish play, as Theorem 7.4 and Lemma 7.5
demonstrate, implying suboptimal C(S + T ) > C(O) induced cost (since ∃j : sj 6= oj).
Hence, the only option for the Leader is to recursively assign optimal load sj = oj to any linkMj currently under-loaded
nj < oj and simplify the game by removing suchMj’s, see Section 7.4, which combines the results of Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
7.1. A monotonicity property
Now we give a simple proof for a monotonicity property that will be important to our proof methodology. A similar
property was proved in [24, Theorem 3] via alternating paths for general s–t nets. Previously, this was also shown with
methods of sensitivity analysis in [14]. After the publication of our work, the authors in [43] gave an alternative proof.
Proposition 7.1. If on (M, r ′), (M, r) holds r ′ ≤ r, for the respective NEs N,N ′ holds n′i ≤ ni,∀Mi ∈ M.
Proof. N is Nash equilibrium of flow r on M and by Definition 4.1, ∃ LN > 0, such that for each link Mi ∈ M if ni > 0 then
`i(ni) = LN , otherwise `i(ni) = `i(0) ≥ LN . Let
MN
+ = {Mi ∈ M : ni > 0} and MN− = {Mi ∈ M : ni = 0}. (4)
Similarly for equilibrium N ′ of the flow r ′, let LN ′ > 0 the corresponding constant. To reach a contradiction, suppose that
∃Mi0 ∈ M such that n′i0 > ni0 . Then `i0(n′i0) = LN
′
> `i0(ni0) ≥ LN , since each `i(·) is strictly increasing. Then, each linkMi ∈
MN
+
must have load n′i > ni under N ′, otherwise it will experience latency `i(n
′
i) ≤ `i(ni) = LN < LN ′ which is impossible,
since N ′ is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we reach a contradiction since we get r ′ ≥∑Mi∈MN+ n′i >∑Mi∈MN+ ni = r. 
7.2. Identifying the useful strategies
Luckily, by the Nash assignment N of the users, all links may end up optimum-loaded (Definition 4.3). In this way, N ≡ O
and the cost C(N) of the system is minimized, that is C(N) = C(O). In general N 6≡ O, since the selfish users prefer and
6 After the publication of our work a more clear picture on the property C(S + T ) 6= C(N) was provided. In [43, Eq. (1)] it was shown that any useful
strategy S inducing C(S + T ) < C(N) must control at least the minimum Nash load mini=1,...,m{ni|ni < oi} on any under-loaded link Mi (Definition 4.3),
i = 1, . . . ,m.
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thus over-load fast links, while dislike and under-load slower ones, increasing the cost C(N) > C(O). The crucial role of
strategy S is to wisely pre-assign load si ≥ 0 to each link Mi ∈ M . This is successful to the extent that the induced Nash
assignment T made by the users will assign an additional load ti ≥ 0 to each Mi, yielding the nice property si + ti = oi for
each i = 1, . . . ,m. Intuitively, strategy S biasses the initial Nash assignmentN to the induced one T , in a way that S+T ≡ O,
minimizing the induced overall cost C(S + T ) = C(O) on systemM .
Theorem 7.2 describes each Stackelberg strategy S inducing Nash assignment T with cost C(S + T ) = C(N). In other
words, Theorem 7.2 describes exactly all those useless strategies that induce cost indifferent from C(N). Then, it is useless
for OpTop to employ such a strategy S when trying to escape from a particular Nash equilibrium N with C(N) > C(O).
Theorem 7.2. If for strategy S holds ∀j, sj ≤ nj then for the induced Nash assignment T it holds ∀j, nj = sj + tj. In other words,
the initial Nash assignment N will coincide to S + T .
Proof. Since N is a Nash equilibrium on the links inM with
∑m
i=1 ni = r , then there exists a constant LN > 0, such that for
each link Mj ∈ M that receives load nj > 0 it holds `j(nj) = LN . That is, all loaded links incur the same latency LN to the
systemM . Consider an arbitrary Stackelberg strategy S, assigning load sj ≤ nj to eachMj ∈ M with∑mi=1 si = βr, β ∈ [0, 1].
Since for eachMj ∈ M it holds sj ≤ nj then ∃ tj ≥ 0 such that tj = nj − sj and also∑mi=1 ti = (1− β)r . Let T = 〈t1, . . . , tm〉
be this assignment on M . Obviously, for the same constant LN > 0 as above, it holds: `j
(
(nj − sj)+ sj
) = `j(nj) = LN , for
eachMj ∈ M with tj > 0. This means that T is a Nash equilibrium on systemM and also S + T ≡ N . 
Definition 7.3. Each Stackelberg strategy S that satisfies Theorem 7.2 is called useless-strategy, otherwise is called useful-
strategy.
7.3. Each frozen link gets no induced selfish flow
It is helpful to quote here themain difficulty on approximating the optimal strategy, as described in [23, Sections 4.1-4.2].
Let S∗ an optimal strategy, T ∗ the inducedNash, and subsetM>0(M=0) of links that do (not) get induced selfish flow. The hard
part is to decide whether link i belongs toM>0 or toM=0. By observing that all links inM>0 (orM=0) have common latency
`i(si + ti) = L∗ (or common marginal cost (si`i(si))′ = D∗), the authors in [23] reduce such decisions to a multidimensional
knapsack problem.
This section eludes this difficulty by carefully identifying the corresponding subsetsM>0(M=0) via recursively assigning
‘‘wise’’ amounts of flow per proper subset of links. Intuitively, subset (M>0)M=0 stands for (un)frozen links, defined bellow.
In the sequel, Theorem 7.4 and Lemma 7.5 demonstrate an invariant property of frozen links: a frozen link belongs to
M=0, irrespectively of Leader’s play to remaining links.
Theorem 7.4. If strategy S freezes (Definition 4.4) every link it assigns flow then all frozen links get no induced selfish flow.
Proof. Let the Nash assignment N = 〈n1, . . . , nm〉 on instance (M, r). Strategy S = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉 freezes every link it assigns
load, that is, either sj ≥ nj or sj = 0,∀j. We show that on each frozen link Mj ∈ M the induced Nash assignment T assigns
flow tj = 0.
N is a Nash equilibrium, and by Definition 4.1, ∃ LN > 0 : ∀Mi ∈ M , if ni > 0 then `i(ni) = LN , otherwise `i(ni) ≥ LN . Fix
a Stackelberg strategy S and let the subsystems of frozen and unfrozen links:
MS
+ = {Mi ∈ M : si ≥ ni} and MS− = {Mi ∈ M : si = 0} (5)
partitioning systemM . Each frozen linkMi ∈ MS+ receiving induced load ti ≥ 0 experiences a posteriori higher latency (less
appealing) than the initial common value LN , since:
`S
+
i (ti) = `i(ti + si) ≥ `i(si) ≥ `i(ni) ≥ LN . (6)
On the contrary, on each unfrozen link Mj ∈ MS− its a posteriori latency function remains the same as before applying
strategy S (since sj = 0):
`S
−
j (tj) = `j(tj + sj) = `j(tj). (7)
The induced Nash assignment T by strategy S assigns the remaining selfish flow onM . This flow is≤ the initially∑Mj∈MS− nj
selfish flow assigned under N only on unfrozen links inMS
−















Taking advantage (7) and (8), Proposition 7.1 implies that the remaining free flow that appears in LHS of (8), even if it is
assigned selfishly only on the subsystemMS
−
of unfrozen machines, then ∀Mj ∈ MS− it will yield induced flow 0 < tj ≤ nj.
Therefore ∀Mj ∈ MS− : tj > 0⇒ `j(tj) ≤ `j(nj) = LN and by (6) we conclude that no induced selfish flow on any unfrozen
link inMS
−
has incentive to route through any frozen machine inMS
+
. 
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Lemma 7.5. If strategy S have frozen (Definition 4.4) some (and not all) of the links it assigns flow then frozen links get no selfishly
induced flow.
Proof. Suppose that strategy S assigns on each linkMj either sj ≥ nj or even sj < nj (freezes only some of the links it assigns
flow). We show that the induced Nash T assigns tj = 0 on each frozen linkMj : sj ≥ nj.
N is the initial Nash equilibrium, and by Definition 4.1, ∃ LN > 0 such that for each linkMi ∈ M , if ni > 0 then `i(ni) = LN ,
otherwise `i(ni) ≥ LN . Let the subsystems of frozen and unfrozen links:
MS
+ = {Mi ∈ M : si ≥ ni} and MS− = {Mi ∈ M : si < ni}.
Similarly as in (6), each frozen linkMi ∈ MS+ receiving induced load ti ≥ 0 now experiences latency
`S
+
i (ti) = `i(ti + si) ≥ `i(si) ≥ `i(ni) ≥ LN . (9)
However, here we do not have the nice fact as in (7), since now the link latency function in MS
−
have been changed by
S (since now may be sj 6= 0 for link Mj ∈ MS− ) and we can not directly apply Proposition 7.1. We can circumvent this,
reworking the proof of Proposition 7.1, as follows.
Suppose that ∃Mi0 ∈ MS− : si0 + ti0 > ni0 (thus ti0 > 0, since si0 < ni0 ). Then `i0(si0 + ti0) > `i0(ni0) and since
`i0(ni0) ≥ LN we get `i0(si0 + ti0) > LN . From this, for any linkMj ∈ MS− , it must hold: `j(sj+ tj) > LN , since T is the induced
equilibrium. This implies sj + tj > nj > 0 for each link Mj ∈ MS− ∩ MN+ , recall (4) defining subsystems MN+ ,MN− . Also,
for each linkMj ∈ MS− ∩MN− we have sj ≤ nj = 0 and thus tj ≥ nj = 0. We conclude that if ∃Mi0 ∈ MS− : si0 + ti0 > ni0 ,





























7.4. Proof of Corollary 2.2
Here we combine the results proved in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
First comes Theorem 7.2 (Section 7.2). It forces OpTop to freeze at least one link, otherwise OpTop induces equilibrium
identical the initial one (a useless strategy, Definition 7.3). Now, any useful strategy must freeze all currently under-loaded
(Definition 4.3) links to their optimum flow. Otherwise, Theorem 7.4 and Lemma 7.5 (Section 7.3), demonstrate that any
non optimally frozen link will stuck to its suboptimal flow. Thus, the induced equilibrium will not yield system’s optimum.
As soon as OpTop freezes all currently under-loaded links, it safely discards them from the system: there is no way for
their flow to change. This yields a simpler subsystem.
OpTop recursively freezes to their optimal flows all under-loaded links and discards them from the system at hand, until
it encounters a subsystem with no under-loaded links
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